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CAN LEGISLATIVE REFORM SECURE 
REWARDS FOR AUTHORS? EXPLORING 
OPTIONS FOR THE NEW ZEALAND 
COPYRIGHT ACT  
Lucy Elizabeth Kenner* 
Copyright law protects works, but not the authors who create them. As the weaker party in 
negotiations, authors face insufficiently remunerative bargains, often made early in their careers. The 
Copyright Act 1994 is currently under review, and reform should be considered. This article explores 
legislative mechanisms to secure rewards for authors from their works. It considers the contrasting 
schemes in the United States and in Germany and evaluates the desirability of adopting these 
approaches in New Zealand. The United States approach is a termination right that allows authors 
to recapture their copyrights after 35 years. The scheme in Germany requires that authors' contracts 
meet minimum equitable standards or be subject to amendment. This article considers that there are 
significant problems with adopting either approach in New Zealand. These include the risk of harming 
authors overall, enforcement, the interests of disseminators, arbitrariness, uncertainty and 
administrative difficulties. This article recommends that neither option is desirable. It concludes that 
while there is a clear need for solutions, a cautious approach must be taken to any reforms which are 
intended to address such a complex problem. 
I INTRODUCTION  
We signed a publishing agreement as unsuspecting teenagers, over three decades ago, when just starting 
out and when we knew no better – Nick Rhodes, Duran Duran.1 
In 1980, five young British musicians sold the rights to exploit their works to Gloucester Place 
Music, owned by United States company Sony/ATV. The contracts were not unusual. In exchange 
  
*  Submitted as part of the LLB (Hons) programme at Victoria University of Wellington. I am grateful to my 
supervisor, Professor Graeme Austin, for his invaluable guidance and support. I would also like to thank the 
anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and advice.  
1  Nicola Harley "Duran Duran lose High Court battle over US song rights in copyright test case" The Telegraph 
(online ed, United Kingdom, 2 December 2016). 
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for assigning their worldwide copyrights to all future works made during the term of the contracts, 
they would each receive an advance and royalties.2 Those musicians were Duran Duran. The band 
soared to pop stardom, producing international hits "Hungry Like the Wolf" and "Girls on Film". 
Under the contracts, 37 of their most popular songs were automatically assigned to Gloucester Place 
Music, and their proceeds predetermined.3 Over three decades later, they sought to be released from 
their contracts, or at least, a chance to revise the deal. Had United States copyright law applied, they 
would have been able to recapture the right to exploit their songs in the United States under the United 
States termination right.4 This would have allowed the band to renegotiate a substantially better deal 
for the exploitation of their copyrights in the United States—the most lucrative market for their works. 
Instead, an English court's interpretation of the contracts left Duran Duran empty-handed, tied to the 
original bargain.5 
Authors are central to the legitimacy of copyright.6 While copyright in a work originally vests in 
the author,7 he or she will typically assign or licence the rights to an intermediary (such as a publisher), 
which will disseminate the work to the public.8 These intermediaries will be referred to in this article 
as ''disseminators''. The transfer of rights can be forever. 9  Thus copyright protection is not 
synonymous with providing rewards to authors, as it is not necessarily authors' interests that are 
protected.10 
When copyright contracts are formed, stronger parties may negotiate on more favourable terms.11 
Creative industries are typically characterised by a large number of aspiring authors, and a small 
number of disseminators.12 Combined with the fact that powerful corporations hold extensive market 
  
2  Gloucester Place Music Ltd v Le Bon [2016] EWHC 3091 (Ch) at [2].  
3  At [3].  
4  17 USC § 203. 
5  Gloucester Place Music Ltd v Le Bon, above n 2, at [44]. 
6  See IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 14, [2009] CLR 458 at 470 where the High 
Court of Australia stated: "The 'author' of a literary work and the concept of 'authorship' are central to the 
statutory protection given by copyright legislation, including the [Australian] Act." 
7  Copyright Act 1994, s 21(1). 
8  Colin Golvan Copyright Law and Practice (The Federation Press, Sydney, 2007) at 217.  
9  The copyright in most works lasts for the life of the author plus 50 years: Copyright Act, s 22(1). 
10  Jane Ginsburg "How Copyright Law Got a Bad Name For Itself" (2002) 26 Colum J L & Arts 61 at 62.  
11  Giuseppina D'Agostino Copyright, Contracts, Creators: New Media, New Rules (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham, 2010) at 113.  
12  William Patry How to Fix Copyright (Oxford University Press, New York, 2011) at 29.  
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information unavailable to authors,13 such as valuations for similar works and market demand, 
authors are placed in a weak bargaining position from the outset.14  
It is also virtually impossible to predict whether an author's work will be successful until it has 
been exploited, which typically occurs only after contracting.15 If the work becomes particularly 
lucrative, the initial bargain will no longer reflect its true value. This will be referred to in this article 
as the ''prediction problem''. 
These problems have not gone unnoticed. Copyright has been criticised by commentators for not 
protecting the paramount interests of authors.16 A handful of countries have responded by taking 
legislative measures to protect authors' rewards, not just their works. Such measures include 
restricting lump sum buyouts,17  declaring onerous terms in copyright contracts void,18  and the 
opportunity for authors to recapture their copyrights after a number of years.19 These will be called 
''re-evaluation mechanisms'' in this article, as they seek to ''re-evaluate'' authors' bargains on more 
lucrative terms.  
The New Zealand Copyright Act 1994 is currently under review.20 In light of overseas responses 
to the problems just identified, adopting a re-evaluation mechanism deserves serious consideration. 
This article explores whether, and if so how, such a scheme should be adopted. It has three substantive 
parts. Part II describes the current position in New Zealand and argues that there are solid historical 
foundations for reform. Part III sets out two contrasting systems: termination of transfers in the United 
States and the regulation of authors' contracts in Germany. I provide an evaluation of these schemes 
in Part IV. 
  
13  Ruth Towse "Copyright Policy, Cultural Policy and Support for Artists" in Wendy Gordon and Richard Watt 
(eds) The Economics of Copyright: Developments in Research and Analysis (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham, 2003) 66 at 69. 
14  Golvan, above n 8, at 218–219. 
15  Kate Darling "Contracting About the Future: Copyright and New Media" (2012) 10 NJTIP 485 at 513. 
16  See Jane Ginsburg "The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law" (2003) 52 DePaul L Rev 
1063 at 1065.  
17  Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle 1992 (France), arts L131-4, L132-5–L132-6 (translation: Intellectual 
Property Code).  
18  Auteurswet 1912 (Netherlands), s 25f (translation: Copyright Act).  
19  17 USC §§ 203 and 304(c). 
20 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment Review of the Copyright Act 1994: Terms of Reference 
(2017). 
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Insofar as providing an income to authors remains a justification for copyright, re-evaluation 
mechanisms are fundamentally worthwhile.21 However, on closer analysis there are real obstacles in 
the way of reform. As I argue below, termination rights benefit bestselling authors without addressing 
structural inequality or balancing the interests of disseminators. While regulating copyright contracts 
is appealing in theory, in practice authors are unlikely to enforce their rights under such a scheme, 
and there are further difficulties with uncertainty and administration. If one or both of these options 
is proposed in New Zealand, I conclude that neither one should be adopted.  
New Zealand is a net importer of copyright works.22 Assuming that a re-evaluation mechanism 
applies to all authors, any benefits that result from adopting these schemes will predominantly accrue 
overseas. Accordingly, the case for reform in New Zealand should be particularly compelling. As I 
conclude, it is not. 
II SETTING THE SCENE IN NEW ZEALAND  
A The Current Position  
1  The Copyright Act 1994 
The New Zealand Copyright Act does not contain a re-evaluation mechanism.23 As in other 
Common Law countries, the copyright in a work is easily assigned.24 Almost invariably, contracts 
assigning the copyright entirely or granting a licence to exploit the works will be upheld.25 
2  Unconscionable bargain and restraint of trade  
Even so, there may be some doctrines of contract or common law that might offer authors some 
relief. In theory, an author could invoke the unconscionable bargain doctrine.26 However, because an 
inequality of bargaining power alone is insufficient to establish unconscionability, courts in New 
  
21  Rebecca Giblin "Reimagining Copyright's Duration" in Rebecca Giblin and Kimberlee Weatherall (eds) What 
if We Could Reimagine Copyright? (ANU Press, Acton, 2017) 177 at 192. 
22  Stephanie Woods "Creative Commons: A Useful Development in the New Zealand Creative Sphere?" (2008) 
14 Canta L Rev 31 at 35. 
23  The artist's right to receive additional proceeds whenever his or her artwork is resold and equitable 
remuneration for performers have been considered but rejected: Ministry of Economic Development 
Performers' Rights (Discussion Paper, July 2001); and Ministry for Cultural Heritage A Resale Royalty Right 
for Visual Artists: Options for its Possible Application to New Zealand (Discussion Paper, April 2007). 
24  Subject to the requirement that an assignment of copyright is not effective unless in writing signed by or on 
behalf of the assignor: Copyright Act, s 114. This is subject to the possibility of an assignment in equity. See 
for example Brooker v John Friend Ltd [1936] NZLR 743 (SC) at 749. 
25  Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman Intellectual Property Law (4th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) 
at 319. 
26  Rick Bigwood Exploitative Contracts (Oxford University Press, New York, 2003) at 231.  
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Zealand are unlikely to intervene in absence of striking facts with a particularly immoral flavour.27 
Thus if the author's rewards are consistent with industry norms, the unconscionable bargain doctrine 
will rarely release the author from the contract. Furthermore, as unconscionable conduct is assessed 
at the time of contracting, the doctrine is not equipped to deal with the problem that copyright contracts 
typically appear unfair only with hindsight.28 While in retrospect Duran Duran's royalty split may 
seem inadequate based on their later success, the validity of the contracts was never doubted. As such, 
while the unconscionable bargain doctrine will occasionally offer some solutions for authors, it does 
not provide a substitute for a re-evaluation mechanism. 
The restraint of trade doctrine may provide redress for some authors. For example, in Schroeder 
Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay the House of Lords applied restraint of trade principles to a 
standard form contract entered into between an unknown 21-year-old songwriter and a music 
publisher.29 The contract purported to assign the copyrights for the whole world.30 The publisher 
could terminate the arrangement at will by giving just one month's notice. The artist had no such 
termination right. Schroeder Music was not obliged to publish the songs at all, and if it elected not to 
do so, the artist would not be paid nor could he regain his copyrights.31 Applying restraint of trade 
principles, the Court found the contract to be unenforceable.32 
In New Zealand, the Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017 seems to give an approving nod in 
the direction of the restraint of trade doctrine. Section 83 of the Act allows the court to delete or 
modify a provision that constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade, or to decline to enforce a 
contract where deletion or modification would unreasonably alter the bargain between the parties. In 
the context of athletes' contracts, one Australian commentator has suggested that a flexible approach 
to restraint of trade on public policy grounds in unique industries such as the sporting industry may 
be desirable, noting Schroeder as an example of where the Court placed weight on the inequality of 
bargaining power between the parties. 33  Given the inequality of bargaining power in creative 
industries and the prediction problem, there may be greater scope for the doctrine to re-evaluate 
  
27  Gustav and Co Ltd v Macfield Ltd [2007] NZCA 205 at [47].  
28  The Court of Appeal listed non-exhaustive principles on the unconscionable bargain doctrine that were 
approved by the Supreme Court on appeal. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal's judgment on 
the basis that conduct must be assessed at the time of contracting: Gustav and Co Ltd v Macfield Ltd [2008] 
NZSC 47, [2008] 2 NZLR 735 at [5]. 
29  Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay [1974] 1 WLR 1308 (HL). 
30  At 1310. 
31  At 1313–1314.  
32  At 1315. 
33  David Thorpe "The Use of Multiple Restraints of Trade in Sport and the Question of Reasonableness" (2017) 
7 Australian and New Zealand Sports Law Journal 63 at 77. 
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authors' contracts for policy reasons. While this scope would be more limited than a re-evaluation 
mechanism, given the conclusion of this article, a more tailored restraint of trade doctrine could be 
preferable for a jurisdiction where freedom of contract is highly valued. 
B The Background to Reform  
In light of New Zealand's copyright history, adopting a re-evaluation mechanism might be 
considered a viable policy option in the context of the New Zealand Copyright Act review. Domestic 
policymakers should not be deterred from considering such reforms by the recurring story that 
''copyright'' in the United Kingdom tradition, which New Zealand follows, is less concerned with the 
author than civil law "authors' rights" jurisdictions.34 The fundamental concept of protecting authors' 
rewards in fact dates back to the very first copyright legislation, the Statute of Anne 1710 (Eng).35 
Although the Act has been viewed as predominantly a publishers' instrument, there was an important 
exception.36 If authors remained living 14 years after creating their works, the sole right of printing 
or disposing of copies would return to them for a further 14 years, even if they had previously 
transferred these rights to a publisher.37 In theory, this provided authors with greater control over their 
works.38 While there is little legislative history on the provision, its purpose appears to have been to 
address the weak bargaining position of authors and the prediction problem.39 
This feature of the Statute of Anne was not re-enacted in the Imperial Copyright Act of 1911. 
Instead, the 1911 Act provided that 25 years after the author's death any copyright grant would revert 
to his or her heirs.40 Two years later, New Zealand followed suit and enacted the Copyright Act 1913, 
which substantially resembled its United Kingdom equivalent and also contained such a reversionary 
  
34  Silke von Lewinski International Copyright Law and Policy (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) at 
41.  
35  Statute of Anne 1710 (Eng) 8 Ann c 21. 
36  David Saunders "Dropping the Subject: An Argument for a Positive History of Authorship and the Law of 
Copyright" in Brad Sherman and Alain Strowel (eds) Of Authors and Origins: Essays on Copyright Law 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 1994) 93 at 94.  
37  Statute of Anne, s 11. 
38  Lionel Bently and Jane Ginsburg "'The Sole Right … Shall Return to the Authors': Anglo-American Authors' 
Reversion Rights from the Statute of Anne to Contemporary U.S. Copyright" (2010) 25 Berkeley Tech LJ 
1475 at 1485. 
39  D'Agostino, above n 11, at 116; and Oren Bracha "The Adventures of the Statute of Anne in the Land of 
Unlimited Possibilities: The Life of a Legal Transplant" (2010) 25 Berkeley Tech LJ 1427 at 1438. 
40 Copyright Act 1911 (UK), s 5(2). See Redwood Music Ltd v Francis Day & Hunter Ltd [1981] RPC 337 (HL) 
at 344 where Lord Salmond agreed with the Court of Appeal that the "object of the proviso was to safeguard 
authors and their heirs from the consequences of any imprudent disposition which authors might make of the 
fruits of their talent and originality".  
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provision.41 While in reality these provisions did nothing to benefit authors, as the reversion of 
copyright occurred only after their deaths, the objective of policymakers appears to have been to offer 
some protection from authors' bad bargains, with the benefits falling to their estates.42  
Neither the New Zealand nor the United Kingdom Act currently contains a reversionary 
provision,43 implying that, in this context at least, copyright law in the United Kingdom tradition is 
less concerned with the author than it once was.44 Adopting a re-evaluation mechanism would 
certainly be a notable departure from the status quo of protecting authors' works, but not their incomes. 
Nevertheless, such a scheme would not be entirely foreign to copyright law in New Zealand. 
Combined with the weak bargaining position of authors and the prediction problem, this establishes 
a solid foundation for considering a re-evaluation mechanism in the New Zealand Copyright Act 
review.  
III POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM  
The United States termination right and the regulation of authors' contracts in Germany are two 
of the most prominent re-evaluation mechanisms. I have chosen to evaluate these schemes as they 
offer fundamentally different options for domestic policymakers to consider. 
A The United States Termination Right  
The United States Copyright Act provides authors with a termination right.45 It is the only country 
to have such a right in its copyright law. Authors or their statutory heirs may terminate their copyright 
grants after 35 years by serving the grantee notice of their intention to exercise the right. If the grant 
covers the right of publication, the grant can either be terminated 35 years after publication or 40 years 
after executing the grant, whichever occurs earlier.46 From the start of the relevant period, authors 
have a five-year window in which they must exercise their termination rights. At the date of 
termination, all rights covered by the grants will revert to the author.47 Essentially, authors can get 
their rights back after three decades of signing them away.  
  
41  Copyright Act 1913, s 8(2).  
42  See Paul Torremans and Carmen Otero García-Castrillón "Reversionary Copyright: A Ghost of the Past or a 
Current Trap to Assignments of Copyright?" (2012) 2 IPQ 77 at 78 stating that the "clear objective" was 
protecting authors and their heirs, but that a "reversionary copyright 25 years after the death of the author 
does little to protect the author and his or her heirs from imprudent assignments, and lets their effects continue 
and do harm until 25 years after the death of the author". 
43  Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK). 
44 D'Agostino, above n 11, at 114. 
45  17 USC § 203. 
46  § 203(a)(3). 
47  § 203(b). 
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The termination right cannot be waived in advance,48  representing a notable author-centric 
departure from the freedom of contract that is typically at the forefront of United States copyright 
law.49 This is crucial for any functional re-evaluation mechanism. Due to an inequality of bargaining 
power, authors will presumably be made to forfeit any re-evaluation rights that may be waived in 
advance.50 Following a United States Supreme Court ruling that authors could effectively waive a 
provision in the Copyright Act 1909 that was intended to protect their interests,51 this was precisely 
what occurred.52 The premise behind the provision was thus entirely frustrated.53 
Commentators have assumed that the termination right applies to non-United States authors on 
the basis that international copyright law requires that countries grant foreign and domestic authors 
the same substantive rights.54 The right applies only to United States copyrights – that is, the right to 
exploit the copyright in the United States. While Duran Duran was granted leave to appeal in February 
2017, no date has yet been determined for the hearing. Should an appeal be successful, the band 
members will reclaim their copyrights within the United States. However, Gloucester Place Music 
will retain the right to exploit the songs elsewhere.55  
  
48  § 203(a)(5). 
49  See Deborah Bouchoux Intellectual Property: The Law of Trademarks, Copyrights, Patents and Trade Secrets 
(5th ed, Cengage Learning, Boston, 2016) at 24 where it is argued that the termination right in the United 
States Copyright Act is highly unusual and contrary to the general principles of contract law that once a 
contract has been validly entered into, the parties must abide by its terms.  
50  Anthony Reese "Reflections on the Intellectual Commons: Two Perspectives on Copyright Duration and 
Reversion" (1995) 47 Stan L Rev 707 at 734. 
51  Fisher Music Co v M Witmark & Sons 318 US 643 (1943) at 656–657. In the United States, copyright was 
previously granted for two consecutive 28-year terms. Copyright for the second term was obtained only if 
renewed by the author or the heirs: Copyright Act 1909 (US), s 24. 
52  Suzanne Anderson "Bleak House Revisited: An Appraisal of the Termination Provisions of the 1976 
Copyright Act – Sections 203 and 304(c)" (1986) 65 Or L Rev 829 at 837.  
53  Marc S Brown "Copyright Law – Termination of Transfers; Trump Card or Joker?" (1994) 1 Det C L Ent & 
Sports L F 41 at 52; Adam Rich "Finding the Groove: A Path Forward on Termination of Sound Recording 
Transfers" (2013) 57 N Y L Sch L Rev 363 at 367; and Daniel Gould "Time's Up: Copyright Termination, 
Work-For-Hire and the Recording Industry" (2007) 31 Colum J L & Arts 91 at 101. 
54  Jane C Ginsburg and Robert A Gorman Copyright Law (Foundation Press, New York, 2012) at 92. The 
principle of national treatment is contained in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works 1161 UNTS 30 (opened for signature 9 September 1886, entered into force 24 April 1928) [Berne 
Convention], art 5; and Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (signed 15 April 
1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) [TRIPS Agreement], art 3. As New Zealand is a signatory to both 
treaties proposed reforms would need to comply with these obligations. 
55  Paul Goldstein and Bernt Hugenholtz International Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice (3rd ed, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2013) at 270; and Donald Passman All You Need to Know About the Music 
Business (9th ed, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2015) at 357. 
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Authors are precluded from entering into new agreements regarding their copyrights until after 
termination is effective.56 Importantly, the provision allows them to renegotiate with the original 
grantee or the grantee's successor, effectively offering these parties a right of "first refusal" to the 
copyrights.57 The most likely outcome will consequently be renegotiations between the original 
parties, and a revised deal on terms more lucrative for the author.58 Alternatively, authors may choose 
to contract with a different party, exploit the works themselves or republish them with a creative 
commons licence after regaining their copyrights.59 
The United States termination right has not been without practical difficulties.60 For instance, a 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruling has undermined the purpose of termination 
rights.61  In that ruling, the Court held that the revoking and re-granting of an original licence 
circumvented the termination right,62 indicating that in some circumstances stronger parties will be 
able to sidestep the provision.63 The formalities required for authors to successfully recapture their 
copyrights are also dense, requiring authors to jump through several hoops if they wish to exercise 
their termination rights.64 If such a right is proposed in New Zealand, domestic policymakers will 
need to address these practical issues.  
B Regulating Copyright Contracts  
In 2002, the German Copyright Act was amended to provide authors with a set of interlocking 
provisions intended to secure fair payment under their contracts.65 Like the termination right, parties 
  
56  17 USC § 203(b)(4). 
57  HR Rep No 94-1476 at 127 (1976).  
58  Naz Nazarinia Scott "2013: The Year of Terminations"" (2013) 14 U Denv Sports & Ent LJ 45 at 57. 
59  Amy Gilbert "The Time Has Come: A Proposed Revision to 17 U.S.C. § 203" (2016) 66 Case W Res L Rev 
807 at 828. 
60  Pamela Samuelson "The Copyright Principles Project: Directions For Reform" (2010) 25 Berkeley Tech LJ 
1175 at 1241. 
61  The decision concerned the termination right applying to pre-1978 works under 17 USC § 304(c).  
62  Milne v Stephen Slesinger Inc 430 F 3d 1036 (9th Cir 2005) at 1042–1043. 
63  See Sean Stopler "Termination Rights: An In-Depth Look at Looming Issues Under the Copyright Act of 
1976" (2011) 13 Tex Rev Ent & Sports L 33 at 47 noting the same outcome as Milne v Stephen Slesinger Inc 
in Penguin Group USA v Steinbeck 537 F 3d 193 (2nd Cir 2008) but the contrary ruling in Classic Media v 
Mewborn 532 F 3d 978 (9th Cir 2008).  
64  Anthony Reese "Termination Formalities and Notice" (2016) 96 B U L Rev 895 at 898. Authors must serve 
their termination notice not less than two and not more than ten years prior to recapturing their copyrights. 
The termination date must also be between 35 and 40 years after the original grant: 17 USC §§ 203(a)(3)–
203(a)(4)(A). 
65  Urheberrechtsgesetz 1965 (Germany), ss 32, 32a and 36 (translation: Copyright Act) [German Copyright 
Act]. As of March 2017, additional reforms are also applicable that are not analysed in depth in this article. 
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cannot contract out of these provisions.66 Under the German Act, authors now have the right to 
contractually agreed "equitable remuneration".67 If remuneration is not equitable, authors may require 
their contracting partners to modify their contracts to provide remuneration that is.68 Remuneration 
will be considered "equitable" if it corresponds with what is "customary and fair" in business, or is 
determined in accordance with a joint remuneration agreement.69 
The Act also specifically addresses the prediction problem through a provision commonly known 
as the "bestseller clause".70 Authors are entitled to require their contracts to be amended to provide 
"further equitable participation" if their remuneration is "conspicuously disproportionate" to the 
profitability of their works.71 Authors may also hold third parties who exploit the works accountable 
under the bestseller clause.72 
Authors' associations and exploiters of copyright works may negotiate "joint remuneration 
agreements" to determine whether remuneration is equitable. 73  The intention is to counteract 
structural inequality by nudging authors toward negotiating collectively, and to increase certainty by 
producing defined standards of acceptable remuneration.74 In reality, authors have tended not to form 
the suggested associations or to initiate negotiations, and very few joint agreements have been 
  
These are the right to information and accountability under ss 32 and 32e, consequences for a breach of joint 
remuneration rules under ss 36b–36c, and the restriction of exclusive exploitation to a period of 10 years if 
the author has received a lump sum payment, with the ability to extend exclusivity to the full period after five 
years under s 40a.  
66  German Copyright Act, ss 32(3) and 32a(3). 
67  Section 32. 
68  Section 32(1). 
69  Section 32(2). 
70  Martin Senftleben "Copyright, Creators and Society's Need For Autonomous Art – The Blessing and Curse 
of Monetary Incentives" in Rebecca Giblin and Kimberlee Weatherall (eds) What if We Could Reimagine 
Copyright? (ANU Press, Acton, 2017) 25 at 60. 
71  German Copyright Act, 32a. Under s 32a(4) the bestseller clause does not apply to remuneration determined 
in accordance with a joint remuneration agreement.  
72  Section 32a(2). 
73  Section 36(1). Under s 36(2) these associations must be representative, independent and empowered to make 
the agreements. 
74  Karsten Gutsche "Equitable Remuneration for Authors in Germany – How the German Copyright Act Secures 
Their Rewards" (2003) 50 J Copyright Socy 257 at 268. 
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reached.75 As this initiative has been relatively unsuccessful in Germany, there is no reason to expect 
it to thrive in New Zealand.76  
The provisions apply to German authors and to nationals of European Union Member States and 
states in the European Economic Area. 77  Whether they also apply to foreign authors remains 
unclear.78 Interestingly, when a termination right was proposed in Germany, it was quickly rejected.79 
IV EVALUATING OPTIONS FOR REFORM  
In this Part, I discuss whether a re-evaluation mechanism should be adopted in New Zealand, 
drawing on the United States and German schemes. There are significant problems with taking either 
approach. These problems include rewarding bestsellers at the expense of all others, harming 
disseminators, arbitrariness and uncertainty, and administrative difficulties that sprawl into the 
unknown. On balance, these obstacles outweigh the benefits of adopting either scheme in the New 
Zealand Copyright Act. 
A The Prediction Problem  
One purpose of re-evaluation mechanisms is to address the prediction problem. 80  When 
bestselling authors have signed away their rights before knowing the value of their creative output, a 
termination right can provide the chance to renegotiate a better deal. In contrast, a bestseller clause 
does not adequately address the prediction problem, and will rarely avail authors of bargains that seem 
inadequate in hindsight. 
  
75  Tristan Azzi "General Report: Mechanisms to Ensure Adequate Remuneration for Creators and Performers" 
in Silke von Lewinski (ed) Remuneration for the Use of Works: Exclusivity vs Other Approaches (De Grutyer, 
Berlin, 2017) 85 at 89. 
76  See Senftleben, above n 70, at 57–58, observing that while the German amendments have served as a model 
for reforms in some other countries, most notably the Netherlands, the problem remains as to how legislation 
requiring equitable payment for authors can be made effective in practice.  
77  Gutsche, above n 74, at 271. 
78  According to Hilty and Peukert the provisions apply to authors from Germany, European Union Member 
States and the European Economic Area but extend to foreign authors only in limited circumstances. Dietz 
argues that the provisions constitute "rights" under the Berne Convention, above n 54, and TRIPS Agreement, 
above n 54, therefore national treatment applies and foreign authors can also rely on them: Reto Hilty and 
Alexander Peukert "Equitable Remuneration in Copyright Law: The Amended German Copyright Act as a 
Trap for the Entertainment Industry in the US?" (2004) 22 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 401 at 443; and Adolf 
Dietz "Amendment of German Copyright Act in Order to Strengthen the Contractual Position of Authors and 
Performers" (2002) 33 IIC 828 at 840. 
79  Gutsche, above n 74, at 358. 
80 Stella Brown "It Takes a Village to Make a Difference: Continuing the Spirit of Copyright" (2014) 12 Nw 
J Tech & Intell Prop 129 at 133. 
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First, a bestseller clause will usually provide authors with relief only if they are remunerated by 
lump sum payment as opposed to royalties.81 The income of authors who receive royalties will 
automatically increase if their works later become successful. This will leave the proportion of their 
income relative to industry proceeds unchanged, and hence their remuneration will not become 
conspicuously disproportionate.82 For example, in the 1930s Joe Shuster and Jerry Siegel sold their 
copyrights to Superman for the market rate, USD 130.83 While DC Comics got rich, Shuster and 
Siegel did not,84 and were haunted by their disastrous transfer until their deaths.85 Under the German 
bestseller clause, Shuster and Siegel's proceeds would certainly be considered conspicuously 
disproportionate, entitling them to further equitable participation. In contrast, Duran Duran's 
remuneration is determined by royalty payments.86 The income received by the band members has 
therefore adjusted proportionately to the success of their works. As a result, they would be unable to 
successfully seek recourse and claim further equitable participation under the bestseller clause. The 
United States termination right does not distinguish between these scenarios and would apply equally 
to Duran Duran. Because music and publishing industries typically remunerate authors via royalties, 
adopting a bestseller clause in New Zealand will not provide redress for many successful authors 
beyond the royalty rate stipulated in their contracts.87  
Even if bestselling authors could rely on either scheme, a termination right is more likely to yield 
lucrative rewards than a bestseller clause. Authors seeking to retrieve their New Zealand copyrights 
under a termination right will have a valuable bargaining chip in hand for their renegotiations, though 
this will admittedly be of modest value beside the significant market for copyright works in the United 
States. In contrast, authors whose remuneration is conspicuously disproportionate under a bestseller 
clause will receive some ''additional'' payment as deemed appropriate.88 Because this amount need 
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only be proportionate to industry revenue, fully recapturing the right to exploit their copyright in New 
Zealand will provide bestsellers with the better deal.  
On first impression, it may seem that bestselling authors who receive royalties do not need a re-
evaluation mechanism.89 For instance, Duran Duran members Simon Le Bon and Nick Rhodes are 
each worth USD 60 million.90 But focusing on what bestselling authors ''need'' misses the point. 
Instead, the moral case is that when corporate entities reap a "gazillion dollars" of which the author 
sees but a fraction, this is unjust, and authors deserve better treatment.91 As the Duran Duran saga 
illustrates, this argument has considerable force, particularly when authors have unknowingly and 
irreversibly sold their rights at a young age for what in hindsight seems a pittance.  
Termination rights can alleviate the prediction problem by giving bestselling authors a "second 
bite at the apple" once they have realised the true value of the rights that they have signed away.92 
Provided that their works are still valuable, renegotiations with disseminators will almost invariably 
provide bestsellers with a more lucrative deal.93 If the purpose of copyright is to reward authors, not 
just to give them enough to get by, adopting a termination right in New Zealand is worthy of serious 
consideration.94 For the reasons that follow, however, optimism is premature. 
B Beyond Bestsellers 
Most authors will not benefit if a termination right is adopted in New Zealand. Media attention 
has typically focused on well-known superstar authors such as Paul McCartney,95 Victor Willis,96 
and Duran Duran, who have undersold their rights and sought redress under the United States 
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termination right. For those who do not enjoy superstar success, the effects of the right are not so 
clear, and require further scrutiny. At best, termination rights are unusable by most authors and thus 
fail to address the structural inequality within copyright industries. At worst, they may exacerbate that 
inequality.  
Termination rights may harm the interests of authors, rather than do them any good. Only the most 
successful works will remain valuable in the longer term, and the authors of these works will likely 
exercise their termination rights.97 Accordingly, parties will enter contracts understanding that, if the 
works are profitable when the termination right becomes available, the author will require 
renegotiation or else pursue a better deal elsewhere. Hence disseminators will no longer be assured of 
retaining the rights for the full copyright term—a considerable loss,98 as the copyright in most works 
lasts for the author's lifetime, and 50 years beyond that.99 Disseminators will thus anticipate receiving 
a lower payoff in the event that an author's work becomes successful, and consequently will place less 
value on new contracts with unknown authors. 100  As the expected returns decrease, so does 
willingness to pay. Essentially, the cost of bestsellers filing to retrieve their copyrights in the future 
is likely to be felt by authors taking an initial pay cut under their contracts.101 The prospect of authors 
later offsetting this effect by recapturing their copyrights or renegotiating a better deal will never 
materialise for most. 102  Accordingly, while the purpose of the United States provision was 
"safeguarding authors against unremunerative transfers", a closer analysis suggests that termination 
rights are instead likely to expose authors to more of these transfers.103 Overwhelmingly, incomes in 
creative industries are already skewed in "winner takes all" patterns.104 While a select few receive 
extraordinarily high earnings, average incomes fall well below the median level.105 Because the real 
beneficiaries of termination rights are bestselling authors, critics of the United States provision have 
likened it to a regressive tax, transferring income from those who need it most, to those who need it 
  
97  Matthew Noller "Darkness on the Edge of Town: How Entitlements Theory Can Shine a Light on Termination 
of Transfers in Sound Recordings" (2012) 46 Ga L Rev 763 at 787. 
98  Kate Darling "Occupy Copyright: A Law & Economic Analysis of U.S. Author Termination Rights" (2015) 
63 Buff L Rev 147 at 166. 
99 Copyright Act, s 22(1).  
100  Gilbert, above n 59, at 810. 
101  Brown, above n 80, at 147. 
102  Darling, above n 98, at 166. 
103  HR Rep No 94-1476 at 124 (1976). 
104  Martin Kretschmer "Copyright and Contract Law: Regulating Creator Contracts: The State of the Art and a 
Research Agenda" (2010) 18 J Intell Prop L 141 at 149–150. 
105  Ruth Towse "What We Know, What We Don't Know, and What Policy-Makers Would Like us to Know 
About the Economics of Copyright" (2011) 8 Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues 101 at 107. 
 EXPLORING OPTIONS FOR THE NEW ZEALAND COPYRIGHT ACT 585 
 
 
least.106 If this is the case, termination rights are antithetical to the very purpose of re-evaluation 
mechanisms, which are designed to protect authors in vulnerable positions.107  
Even if a termination right does not harm most authors, in any event, it offers them no relief. 
Termination rights will place authors in stronger positions vis-à-vis disseminators only if their works 
remain valuable when they may first recapture their copyrights. Needless to say, few works will be 
worth anything after 35, 20 or even 15 years. It follows that, even if authors do not have to wait a full 
35 years to exercise their termination rights, this will offer little comfort at the start of their careers 
when they are most in need of income.108 Adopting such a right in the New Zealand Copyright Act 
will thus not address the crux of the problem—that is, an inequality of bargaining power within 
copyright industries. While enabling authors to recapture their rights is superficially attractive, 
termination rights intervene far too late to provide authors with solutions when a re-evaluation 
mechanism is most needed. 
C Enforcing Re-evaluation   
A requirement that authors must be fairly paid seems to promise more.109 However, the difficulty 
is that authors are unlikely to enforce such a requirement if they must confront stronger parties. This 
gives re-evaluation rhetoric a strong dose of realism. Although re-evaluation mechanisms that 
mandate ''equitable'' payment for authors under their contracts are attractive in theory, they are unduly 
optimistic.  
For authors without bargaining power, long-term career prospects are likely to prevail over 
enforcing such re-evaluation rights even when entitled to do so. There is typically an oversupply of 
authors in creative industries,110  and the competition for publishing contracts can be fierce. 111 
Accordingly, authors will be conscious that they can easily be replaced with someone more compliant 
if they object to the terms on offer, thus losing a sought-after publishing opportunity. Negotiating 
better terms is rarely an option, and authors are still likely to accept contracts deemed unsatisfactory 
under such a re-evaluation mechanism if the alternative is being left with no contract at all.112 After 
securing a publishing contract, authors may still be hesitant to enforce their rights for fear of being 
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blacklisted.113 If required to confront stronger parties, authors will need to balance the chance of 
securing a better deal with the possibility of irreparably damaging the relationship with their 
disseminator. Careers are at stake, and future opportunities may well be prejudiced should this 
relationship turn hostile.114 Keeping quiet to maintain goodwill is likely to be the safer and more 
pragmatic option. Beyond this relationship, authors will be wary of gaining a negative reputation in 
the wider industry for being an irksome contracting partner.115 Particularly in close-knit industries, 
such a reputation would presumably take a heavy toll on an author's future opportunities.  
These difficulties have been apparent in Germany. Under the German Copyright Act, authors 
must face stronger parties should they wish to enforce their rights under the provisions. Even if the 
contract obviously falls short of the standards required under the Act, the author will need to confront 
disseminators to duly inform them of their failure to meet said standards.116 One commentator has 
remarked that as a result, "pragmatism prevails over the application of the rules of law" in the context 
of the amendments.117 In other words, while these reforms certainly appear revolutionary for authors 
in theory, they have not been so in practice.118 It has not so far proven workable to enforce equitable 
payment for authors with this particular re-evaluation mechanism. Accordingly, domestic 
policymakers should refrain from ''window-dressing'' in the New Zealand Copyright Act, and avoid 
such reforms that will not achieve their purpose.  
D Interests of Disseminators 
Disseminators play a vital role in the copyright system by delivering works to the public, market 
expertise and investment in authors. Their interests are unlikely to align with a re-evaluation 
mechanism that provides authors with a greater proportion of the copyright revenue.119 Particularly 
in relation to a termination right, domestic policymakers had best be advised that disseminators do 
have a compelling case.  
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The first issue is that termination rights may deprive disseminators of proceeds generated by their 
own efforts.120 Investment in merchandising, the establishment of global networks and the provision 
of resources and expertise may be inextricably connected with the success of an author's work.121 
Although digital technology has allowed some to self-publish,122 disseminator investment often 
remains vital in order to produce quality works that get noticed amid floods of content.123 In the music 
industry for instance, expensive technology is often required for artists to become global bestsellers. 
As such, disseminators' claims that "[m]aking great content requires investment" have merit.124 
Because authors can fully recapture their copyrights under a termination right, there is no distinction 
between their contributions on the one hand, and disseminators' contributions on the other. Thus in 
exercising the right, authors may enjoy the fruits of disseminators' labour as well as their own.125  
Disseminators also share the prediction problem, 126  and a termination right overlooks their 
investment risk.127 Typically, disseminators will invest in multiple authors, each with a very small 
chance of success. Although heavy losses are incurred when authors are unsuccessful, these can be 
absorbed due to large profits made from bestselling works,128 allowing disseminators to mitigate the 
risk of investing in those who are just beginning their careers.129 This arrangement is mutually 
beneficial, as authors who cannot shoulder the cost of failure may hand this risk to disseminators who 
can.130 In return, disseminators can expect to receive the greater share of revenue in the unlikely event 
that a work becomes successful.131 By allowing bestselling authors to recapture their copyrights, 
termination rights undermine this initial allocation of risk.132 
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Adopting a termination right may also curb the production of new works.133 Copyright industries 
have traditionally been heavily dependent on capital from a small handful of bestselling works to 
reinvest into making new ones.134 Because bestsellers are inclined to exercise their termination rights, 
the available funds for new investment will likely decrease. With less to go around, fewer upcoming 
authors can expect to receive support from disseminators for creating new works.135 In this respect, 
one unintended effect of termination rights that supposedly support authors' endeavours may be 
reducing their opportunities to produce creative works overall. 
These arguments are perhaps less convincing as distribution and production costs decline,136 and, 
in light of new technology enabling the cheaper, faster delivery of works, disseminators should not 
retain the lion's share of revenue if their justifications are outdated.137 While true to an extent, these 
considerations should not be overstated. Wholly self-publishing industries have not yet materialised, 
and disseminators are still needed.138 Although introducing a termination right in New Zealand is 
unlikely by itself to bring disseminators to financial ruin, their concerns cannot be dismissed, and 
provide forceful reasons against adopting these kinds of reforms.139  
Regulating authors' contracts, as under the German scheme, appears to be less radical for 
disseminators. For one, disseminators who already provide authors with equitable, proportionate 
rewards will be unaffected by the provisions.140 When the provisions do intervene, they will not—
unlike a termination right—confiscate a disseminator's ability to exploit the copyrights. Instead, 
disseminators will be required only to provide authors with some additional payment on fairer terms. 
Compared to the ''all or nothing'' approach of termination rights, such a re-evaluation mechanism 
offers a preferable compromise in terms of balancing the interests of disseminators.  
Even so, such a scheme will no doubt be politically controversial if proposed in New Zealand. 
Copyright reforms are notoriously contentious, particularly if they will alter the dynamics between 
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competing stakeholders,141 and German publishers vehemently opposed the 2002 amendments.142 
Such opposition should not, in isolation, preclude domestic policymakers from adopting the German 
approach in the New Zealand Copyright Act, but is nevertheless worth bearing in mind.  
E Arbitrary Outcomes  
For a re-evaluation mechanism to be worthwhile, it must allow authors to seek relief when relief 
is needed. The German scheme does so, as those receiving inequitable or conspicuously 
disproportionate remuneration are entitled to redress. Termination rights however, operate on set 
dates, and are blind to all else. Accordingly, they are blunt economic tools, and are unable to provide 
authors with consistent solutions.  
The first issue is that different types of work have varying life spans. For example, while demand 
for a popular song might last only several years, a famous novel may be profitable for much longer. 
Unaffected by such differences, termination rights apply in the identical manner across a wide range 
of works.143 No distinction is made between types of works likely to remain successful for a long 
period of time and those that are not. As to why certain types of work should be more apt than others 
to provide their creators with rewards under a re-evaluation mechanism, no principled explanation 
can be given.  
Second, termination rights cannot reliably address the prediction problem. An author's prospects 
of relief hinge entirely on the value of his or her works at the earliest termination date. Unless that 
value is considerable, no relief is provided. Even the most popular works do not remain profitable in 
perpetuity, and bestselling authors who fall out of favour before they can recapture their rights are 
denied any benefits that a termination right might otherwise have offered. It is difficult to see why an 
author should benefit if his or her works remain profitable after 35 years, but should not benefit if 
profitability has waned after only 30 years. For all relevant purposes these cases are identical, and to 
treat them differently is arbitrary. The 35-year time period stipulated in the United States termination 
right is especially problematic, and reflects a competition between stakeholders as opposed to a 
decision based on sound evidence or policy.144 A small proportion of copyrights are worth recapturing 
after 35 years, and few living authors will benefit from the provision.145 Allowing authors to recapture 
their rights earlier would alleviate the harshness of the United States termination right to some extent, 
and leading commentators have suggested that such an adjustment is well overdue.146 All the same, 
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the arbitrariness of any termination right will persist regardless of the specific number of years that 
might be chosen by domestic policymakers. 
F Encouraging Creativity 
Encouraging the creation of new works has been identified by the Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment as a core objective of copyright in New Zealand.147 This has been 
rehearsed in the context of the terms of reference for the New Zealand Copyright Act review. If re-
evaluation mechanisms encourage authors to create new works, such a reform may be useful for 
furthering this objective in New Zealand. The question is: can a re-evaluation mechanism really 
encourage creativity? 
There are many different reasons for doing creative work aside from financial incentives, such as 
self-expression, reputation and storytelling.148 While this is true, authors too must live, and a day job 
can hinder creative endeavours. For example, not benefitting from their copyrights to Superman, 
Shuster spent his days working as a messenger, and Siegel as a typist.149 For authors on lower incomes 
at least, receiving additional income thanks to a re-evaluation mechanism could make a vital 
difference, allowing them to spend the time necessary for creating new works. The limits of re-
evaluation mechanisms should be noted however, and if an author's works are simply unprofitable, 
then clearly such a scheme will provide no relief.150 
Authors' rewards are also important for normative reasons.151 If they receive meagre proceeds 
from their works compared to industry profits, this implies that they are insufficiently valued, which 
may well discourage creativity. Human rights instruments have drawn this connection between an 
author's income and the intrinsic value of authorship.152 And by safeguarding authors' "material 
interests", re-evaluation mechanisms have been expressly identified by the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights as vehicles to uphold the human right of authorship 
protection.153  In recognising authors' rights and affording them dignity, the ideal re-evaluation 
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mechanism would go beyond simply allowing authors the income required to purchase household 
necessities. Rather, it would also signal that they were valued and worthy of such protection, thus 
supporting creative endeavours. 
In reality, however, a termination right is unlikely to foster creativity to any great extent. First, 
people will favour immediate benefits over benefits for which they must wait,154 and any rewards 
from termination rights will not arrive until decades after an author creates his or her works.155 As 
such, the prospect of exercising a termination right at age 60 will not figure greatly in the mind of a 
25-year-old about to create new work. Creators over the age of 40 need not think of it at all. Secondly, 
future benefits are even less valuable if they are uncertain and may never actually materialise.156 The 
likelihood that the works will be both successful and retain this success until the author can recapture 
the copyrights is small, which further erodes the prospect of termination rights encouraging 
creativity.157 The value of future benefits dwindles further if individuals envision a sizeable increase 
in their incomes before receiving these benefits. By the time a termination right falls due, a bestselling 
author is likely to have already reaped the rewards of a successful career. Even if authors do picture 
themselves decades in the future, expectations of a bestseller's income will undermine the significance 
of any rewards that might be collected from recapturing their copyrights. It is hard to see, at any stage, 
a termination right increasing an author's desire to create new works.  
The German scheme appears more promising for encouraging creativity. Authors need not wait 
half a lifetime in the hope of some conceivable, but highly unlikely, benefit that they may never live 
to see. Instead, they may invoke the provisions when their remuneration is inequitable or 
conspicuously disproportionate. If a re-evaluation mechanism is to have any effect on creativity, it 
must intervene relatively early as opposed to some point in the distant future.158 In addition, the 
provisions are designed to secure fair remuneration from the outset, and to assist authors at the bottom 
of the income ladder. If authors can survive on creative incomes, this allows them to dedicate time to 
creating new works should they wish to do so. However, while logically sound, the outcome is not 
quite so linear. Such a scheme is unlikely to be enforced by authors without bargaining power and, as 
I outline below, suffers from extensive practical difficulties. Consequently, domestic policymakers 
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should not overestimate the prospect of increasing authors' creativity by way of introducing such 
reforms in New Zealand. 
G Third Party Profits  
Third parties will often enjoy the bulk of revenue from an author's work.159  Re-evaluation 
mechanisms that give authors no way of holding third parties to account are thus incapable of 
providing real solutions. A termination right deals swiftly with the issue. When an author files a 
termination notice, third parties will need to negotiate with the author directly should they wish to 
continue exploiting the copyrights.160  
In contrast, accounting for third party exploitation becomes a significant problem if authors ' 
contracts are regulated. Authors cannot recover their grants under such a scheme, hence requiring 
them to investigate both exactly who is profiting from their works and by how much, to determine 
their entitlements from third parties. Partly to address this problem, as of March 2017 the German 
Copyright Act empowers authors to request such information annually from their contracting partners 
and subsequent grantees.161 The purpose of this change appears to have been to make the German 
scheme more workable for authors, thus remedying its ineffectiveness. It remains uncertain whether 
such an information right will improve the usefulness of the amendments and their ability to provide 
authors with relief. In any event, claiming from third parties under such a scheme is still likely to 
prove complex for authors, particularly when profits from their works are divided among numerous 
recipients.  
H Uncertainty  
Uncertainty can derail well-meaning reforms. Although termination rights are "mechanical" and 
arbitrary, this allows them to provide relative clarity.162 Authors will know exactly when they can 
exercise their termination rights, and that should they do so, they will regain their copyrights. 
Anticipating this result, authors and disseminators are able to plan accordingly, and renegotiate an 
appropriate bargain.  
Reforms that rely on concepts of ''fairness'' risk becoming hamstrung by uncertainty. Fifteen years 
after the 2002 amendments in Germany, it remains unclear exactly when an author's remuneration 
will be considered inequitable or conspicuously disproportionate—a cautionary tale for domestic 
policymakers.163 These standards are qualitative, and so determinations must be made for each 
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particular agreement.164 Clearer definitions are wanted, and specific factors indicating whether an 
author's remuneration will be considered equitable.165 According to the explanatory note to the 
German amendments, such factors might include market conditions, disseminator investment and 
risk, number of copies produced and expected proceeds.166 However, even if domestic policymakers 
were to provide more detailed criteria this would still not relieve such a scheme of uncertainty. For 
one, it might not even be possible to decide how copyright revenue ought to be equitably divided.167 
While few would disagree that authors should be paid ''fairly'', fewer would agree on what that 
requires. Standards of fairness are unavoidably subjective, and outcomes reached by applying such 
standards are difficult to predict accurately. 168  Findings of ''inequitable'' or ''conspicuously 
disproportionate'' remuneration will also be contingent on factors such as an author's particular 
industry, type of work and method of receiving income.169 Such factors will vary between authors 
and, without clear precedent, outcomes will be uncertain.  
I Administrative Complications  
Idealism aside, administering a re-evaluation mechanism must be workable for reform. For 
policymakers in a small jurisdiction like New Zealand, this pragmatic factor is a critical issue. 
Introducing any such mechanism will doubtless increase administrative workload and costs, but 
particularly in the case of regulating authors' contracts.  
If authors' contracts are to be assessed, domestic policymakers will first need to decide which 
authority will be responsible for this appraisal. Under the German scheme, the courts are tasked with 
assessing copyright contracts when the parties cannot agree.170 This presents an obvious problem, as 
the cost of taking a full lawsuit deters authors from invoking the provisions.171 The New Zealand 
Copyright Tribunal was established mainly to prevent copyright owner monopoly, and assesses 
proposed licensing schemes and file sharing infringement.172 If the German approach were adopted 
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in New Zealand, the Copyright Tribunal might provide a less costly and more efficient alternative to 
the courts for assessing authors' contracts. The Tribunal is currently empowered to set the rate of 
remuneration paid to copyright owners or licensees in limited circumstances.173 While this rarely 
occurs, it does provide some foundation for the Tribunal to assess authors' remuneration and to set an 
acceptable rate if required.174 As the Copyright Tribunal comprises one chair and five members, and 
hears few disputes annually, its jurisdiction and resources would need to be substantially increased if 
presented with a new and more active role.175 
Enforcement is also essential. Deeming an author's remuneration to be inadequate will ring hollow 
if the contracting partner does not increase this amount accordingly.176 Domestic policymakers must 
consider enforcement in the context of the international market for copyright works. When authors 
have contracted with overseas disseminators, the responsible authority will need to impose its rulings 
on international copyright contracts, monitor compliance and enforce its decisions if necessary.177 
This adds further complexities to regulating authors' contracts under the New Zealand Copyright Act. 
Facing these obstructions might be justified if this reform would deliver real solutions. But, as I have 
argued above, adopting such a scheme is unlikely to provide tangible benefits for either bestsellers or 
vulnerable authors. In light of this, any purported benefits of such a reform are outweighed by its 
practical difficulties. 
Administering a termination right is feasible, but not without difficulty. If a termination right is 
adopted in the New Zealand Copyright Act, some form of record keeping and oversight will 
presumably be required. In the United States, the United States Copyright Office performs all 
administrative functions for the United States termination right, and deals with the registration of 
copyrights.178 Although registration is not mandatory under the United States Copyright Act, 179 it 
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provides benefits to copyright owners by creating a permanent record of their claim to the work,180 
and is required to sue for copyright infringement and to get the benefit of statutory damages and 
attorney's fees.181 There is currently no such copyright registration system in New Zealand. Although 
the Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand (IPONZ) grants and registers national intellectual 
property rights, it does not register copyrights, and deals primarily with trademarks, patents and 
designs.182 Requiring the IPONZ to oversee a termination right would thus be a significant divergence 
from its current role, and precisely how it would fulfil such a function is unclear. As there is currently 
no existing authority that is readily able to administer a termination right in New Zealand, adopting 
this reform would introduce administrative work and associated expense to an unknown extent.  
Perhaps most crucially, termination rights are designed to encourage private renegotiations.183 
Faced with an author's termination notice, disseminators will need to compare the costs of potentially 
unsuccessful court proceedings, losing the New Zealand copyrights and a revised agreement. In this 
situation, renegotiation will often be the preferred option.184 Much of the real work of termination 
rights can thus be carried out between the parties, reducing the potential administration, litigation and 
cost of introducing a re-evaluation mechanism. Still, some disputes will undoubtedly occur. It follows 
that, notwithstanding the likely prevalence of private renegotiations, both the administration and 
litigation of such a scheme will be in uncharted waters. 
J Further Difficulties  
1 Foreign authors 
If considering a re-evaluation mechanism for New Zealand, policymakers must decide whether it 
will be available to all, or only to domestic authors.185 Difficulties will be encountered regardless of 
which option is chosen. The arguments for choosing the former are certainly compelling. Globally, 
authors face weak bargaining positions and the prediction problem, and hence the rationale of 
adopting a re-evaluation mechanism applies equally, regardless of nationality. This is also consistent 
with the interests of domestic authors, as disseminators may be reluctant to invest in these individuals 
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if they perceive that doing so will involve obligations that are not applicable to others.186 If so, 
adopting a scheme that applies to only domestic authors will place them in a worse position than 
before. However, these arguments face pragmatic challenges. As emphasised at the start of this article, 
New Zealand is a net importer of copyright works.187 This means that more foreign works are 
exploited in New Zealand than domestic works. It follows that, if a re-evaluation mechanism does 
apply to all, the administrative demands of such a scheme will be driven by content from overseas. 
Limiting redress to domestic authors stands on shakier idealistic ground, but sits more firmly within 
the bounds of possibility, as disputes will undoubtedly arise much less frequently.  
2 Existing copyright legislation  
Domestic policymakers will also need to consider the extent to which any proposed reforms will 
align with existing copyright legislation. While the New Zealand Copyright Act does contain some 
references to broad concepts such as "equitable remuneration", these provisions are outliers in the 
Act.188 Such a pattern is consistent with copyright in the United Kingdom tradition. According to 
leading commentator von Lewinski, authors' rights systems (of which Germany is one) typically tend 
to be more abstract and ''principles-based'' in comparison to Common Law copyright systems that 
prefer systemic definitions.189 While not precluding the adoption of a re-evaluation mechanism such 
as the German scheme, this implies that domestic policymakers should be wary about importing such 
a ''civil law'' approach into the New Zealand Copyright Act.  
V CONCLUSION  
Weak bargaining positions, and the need to bind themselves to contracts when the value of their 
works is yet unknown have left authors in a troubling position. In a system that does not seem to value 
authorship, the livelihoods, dignity and human rights of authors are at stake. And with the New 
Zealand Copyright Act under review, it is imperative to consider reform. By exploring two re-
evaluation mechanisms that might potentially be adopted, this article has sought to address that need.  
Neither option, however, offers solutions. The United States termination right is blunt, arbitrary, 
and not only incapable of assisting authors when needed but likely to deprive them from the outset. 
Similarly, while the German scheme seems appealing, it is flawed by uncertainty and by obliging 
authors to enforce their rights against disseminators far more powerful than themselves. It would also 
be unwise to ignore the practicalities of such reforms, and bringing either approach into New Zealand 
will necessarily require oversight of an uncertain, and potentially insurmountable, scale.  
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This article shares the ideals of rewarding authors and valuing their creative endeavours. 
However, these ideals are not served by the schemes explored here, and it would be undesirable to 
adopt either option in New Zealand. No single reform is likely to solve what has proven to be a 
complex and interwoven problem. As to adopting a re-evaluation mechanism, caution is 
recommended.  
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